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STANDARDIZED EMPLOYMENT TESTING
VALIDITY OF STANDARDIZED EMPLOYMENT TESTING
UNDER TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
The question whether using standardized tests in making job place-
ment and promotion decisions constitutes unlawful racial discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter referred to
as Title VII) and the equal protection clause of the United States Con-
stitution is controversial and important at present. Commentators have
estimated that as many as 20 percent of all charges filed under Title VII
involve the testing issue.1 Also, many cases have been filed in the federal
district courts alleging violations of equal protection through the use of
standardized tests. After examining the arguments that employment test-
ing can result in racial discrimination, this comment will evaluate the
standards by which the validity of employment testing is measured under
Title VII and the equal protection clause.
II. DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT OF STANDARDIZED EMPLOYMENT TESTING
Standardized tests have long played an important role in the making
of employment decisions in both private industry and government service.2
Probably the basic reason for the use and popularity of such tests is that
they appear to provide the employer with objective criteria upon which
to base decisions concerning job entry and promotion.s The problem with
this is that there is impressive evidence that the standardized tests normally
used-generalized intelligence and aptitude tests-are discriminatory when
given to individuals of all races without regard to the differences in their
social, economic, and cultural backgrounds. 4 "Intelligence is an attribute,
not an entity .... "5 capable of precise measurement by the use of the
same means in all individual cases. Although innate ability is relevant to
test performance, an individual's test performance depends also upon the
extent to which he has assimilated or had the opportunity to assimilate
the knowledge and skills that the test is designed to measure.6
Courts have recognized that standardized test scores are partly the
product of an individual's cumulative experiences7 and that blacks gen-
erally have received education inferior to that received by whites.3 The
same has been said in relation to other minority groups.9 The following
argument has led courts to adopt this position: (1) Minority groups have
1. Cooper & Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HAIv. L.
REv. 1598, 1637 (1969).
2. Id. at 1638.
3. Id. See also 68 CoLUmt. L. REv. 691, 696 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note].
4. See Cooper & Sobel, supra note 1, at 1639-41.
5. Id., quoting Wesman, Intelligent Testing, 23 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 267,
269 (1968).
6. Cooper Se Sobel, supra note 1, at 1639; Comment, Employment Testing
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 268,
270 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
7. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 478 (D.D.C. 1967).
8. See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
9. Cooper & Sobel, supra note 1, at 1641.
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had inferior educational, economic, and cultural opportunities because
of racial discrimination and the cultural separatism that has resulted
therefrom; (2) this racial discrimination, lack of opportunity, and cul-
tural separatism have combined to impede minority group members in
attaining the kind of background necessary for successful performance on
standardized tests; (3) therefore, minority group members achieve lower
scores on standardized tests than do whites.10 Thus, use of standardized
tests by employers without regard to the racial, cultural, and educational
differences of the individuals tested has a markedly discriminatory effect
that is the basis of many allegations of racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII or the equal protection clause.
Popular misconceptions about standardized tests and their utility
tend to compound the problem created as a result of their use by em-
ployers. Most people assume that standardized tests measure only innate
ability, but investigation reveals the importance of a person's background
to his performance on such tests." Many are inclined to believe that
standardized tests developed by experts are valid regardless of the situ-
ation in which they are used; few realize how difficult it is scientifically
to develop a paper and pencil test that will measure a person's possession
of skills that are relevant to the performance of a particular job. 12 In
fact, most people probably assume, merely because their use is widespread,
that standardized aptitude tests are predictive of successful job performance,
although scientific evidence on the subject points to the conclusion that
they are not.' 3 Also, most people accept the proposition that standardized
tests are valid when used to predict ability to learn and promotability in
general, when actually they must be geared to the employer's jobs and to
the group tested in order to have any validity.14
III. VALIDITY oF STANDARDIZED EMPLOYMENT
TESTING UNDER TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Assuming that the use of standardized tests has a discriminatory effect,
the remainder of this comment surveys the treatment of the problem by
the courts when discrimination cases are brought under Title VII and
the equal protection clause. The objective is to determine whether Title
VII and the equal protection clause apply the same standard to testing
cases and, if not, which one is more favorable to a plaintiff and which to
an employer.
A. Title V11
In order for a case of alleged racial discrimination through the use
of standardized tests to be covered by Title VII, the tests must be used in
decision-making by an "employer," as defined by the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1964) as amended by the
Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of
10. Id. at 1640.
11. Id. at 164445.
12. Id. at 1643; E. GISELLI, THE VALIDITY or OC.uPATIONAL APTITUDE TsTs
51(1966).
13. Cooper & Sobel, supra note 1, at 1643-44.
14. Id. at 1647.
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1972). Under the Act of 1964, such an employer is a "person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce" and having 25 or more employees for
each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or a pre-
ceding year.15 The Act of 1972 reduced to 15 the number of employees a
person must have in order to be an "employer". 16 The definition of em-
ployer comprehends the usual types of business organizations, as well as
governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions,
associations, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, and un-
incorporated associations.'7
Once it is determined that the employer is covered by the Act of
1964, as amended, other sections of Title VII must be considered. Under
section 703 (a) (1) & (2) (all section references are to the Act of 1964), it
is an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse
to hire .... because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... "IS or
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.19
These broad provisions appear to make it unlawful for an employer to
use tests having a discriminatory impact upon minorities.
However, section 703 (h), which seems more specifically applicable,
contains some ambiguous language that raises questions as to its standard
for deciding the lawfulness of standardized employment testing. This
section provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer.., to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration
or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.20
The language exempting "professionally developed tests," unless "de-
signed, intended, or used to discriminate" is ambiguous. It can be taken
to approve the use of all standardized tests so long as the employer using
them has no actual intent to discriminate. Or, it can be argued that the
word "used" implies a more objective standard, and that any test that has
a discriminatory effect is proscribed, regardless of the employer's intent
or the fact that the test is "professionally developed." 2 '
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 (b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1964), as
amended 86 Stat. 108 (1972).
16. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 2 (2), 86 Stat. 108 (1972),
amending § 701 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1964).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 708 (a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1964), as
amended 86 Stat. 108 (1972).
18. Id. § 708 (a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1964).
19. Id. § 708 (a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (1964).
20. Id. § 708 (h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1964).
21. Note, supra note 8, at 709-10.
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Although the legislative history of section 708 (l) is of little help in
determining the intent of Congress in adopting it, two distinct views have
emerged. The first view is that Congress wanted to protect only tests that
measure job-related abilities and skills in order to reduce the chance
that standardized tests would be used in such a way as to have a dis-
criminatory effect.22 The other view is that Congress believed that standard-
ized tests serve a genuine business purpose and, therefore, did not want the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.), the agency created
by Congress to administer the Act,23 to regulate the use of such tests. 24
When the E.E.O.C. developed its Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures (hereinafter referred to as Guidelines), the regulations ex-
plicitly incorporated a job-relatedness standard rather than a business
needs or genuine business purpose standard. The Guidelines adopted in
1967 provided:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed
ability test" to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge
or skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the
applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to
measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class
of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or or-
ganization claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without
more, justify its use within the meaning of Title VII.25
The E.E.O.C. has always viewed testing as only one helpful component
of a personnel system and has advocated employment testing procedures
which emphasize these elements:
(1) careful job analysis to define skill requirements related to
the performance of the specific job
(2) special efforts in recruiting minorities
(3) screening and interviewing related to job requirements
(4) tests selected on the basis of specific job-related criteria
(5) comparison of test performance against job performance
(6) opportunity for retesting of those who failed the tests but
then acquired more training or experience
(7) validation of tests for norms that include representative
minority group members26
In addition, new Guidelines adopted in 1970 place a heavy burden
on the employer to justify his use of standardized tests having a detrimental
impact on minority group members. Such tests are now presumed by the
E.E.O.C. to be unlawful unless they have been scientifically validated, and
"the person giving or acting upon the results . . .can demonstrate that
22. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1125 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Developments].
23. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
24. Developments, supra note 22, at 1125. For a general survey of the legis.
lative history of Title VII see Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. &
Com. L. REV. 431 (1966). See also Comment, supra note 6, at 275-76.
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alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are un-
available for his use."27
When all of the Guidelines are taken together, they establish require-
ments that are impossible for all but the largest of employers to follow.
The Guidelines could influence employers away from objective criteria
that have some differential impact on minorities toward more subjective
criteria. The impracticality of the Guidelines may lead more employers
to adopt a quota system for the hiring of minority employees or to adopt
lower cut-off scores for minorities than for whites. Such alternatives could
be just as discriminatory against culturally deprived whites as general
intelligence and aptitude tests are against culturally deprived blacks, and
could raise new legal problems in themselves.28
With a background of ambiguous statutory language, an uninstructive
legislative history, and burdensome E.E.O.C. Guidelines that are difficult
to interpret and to apply, the task of developing workable standards for
the application of Title VII passed to the courts. Case law on the testing
issue under Title VII tended to develop along two lines of authority. In
some cases, the courts adopted the E.E.O.C. standard of job-relatedness and
held that the use of standardized tests was unlawful, unless the tests
measured only those skills and abilities necessary to the performance of a
particular job.2 0 Other decisions rejected the E.E.O.C. standard and held
the use of standardized tests by an employer lawful if the use of the tests
met a business need or served a legitimate business purpose.30 These courts,
in effect, recognized the right of an employer to maintain a work force with
as much measured intelligence as he could find, regardless of the differ-
ential impact that the use of some tests might have on minorities.8 1
The most explicit endorsement of the Guidelines by a court is found
in the case of Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.32 Applicants of Crown
were required to take the Wonderlic Personnel Test, the Bennett Test of
Mechanical Comprehension, and the SRA Non-Verbal. Test scores were
used in making hiring decisions and in deciding which employees should
be promoted. Testimony revealed that 37.3 percent of the white applicants
passed the Wonderlic, as compared to 9.8 percent of the black applicants;
64.9 percent of the whites and only 15.4 percent of the blacks passed the
27. Id.
28. Developments, supra note 22, at 1128-31. See also Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) where Chief Justice Burger said that
the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member
of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority
or majority, is precisely what Congress has proscribed.
29. See Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970);
United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Dobbins v.
Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
30. See United States v. Local 38, Electrical Workers, 428 F.2d 144 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225(4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 316 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Services,
315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
31. See cases cited note 29 supra.
32. 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970).
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Bennett; and that the SRA Non-Verbal also significantly favored whites.3 3
The plaintiff, a black who had failed the tests, brought a class action
alleging that these tests disqualified a disproportionate number of blacks;
that the tests did not predict successful job performance; and that there-
fore, the use of the tests was unlawful under Title VII. He did not allege
that Grown intended to discriminate against blacks.
In endorsing the Guidelines and holding the company's testing pro-
cedures unlawful, the court said that the Guidelines
require that tests be validated in accordance with professional
standards in order to comply with Title VII. In lay terms, this
simply means that the skills measured by the tests must be shown
to be relevant to the employer's job performance needs.3 4
The court also stressed that careful evaluation and study are required
when standardized tests of the kind used by Crown are given to a mixed
racial group, because such tests assume that persons taking them have had
relatively equal exposure to educational materials, and blacks have not
had this equal exposure.3 5 Because Crown offered no study to support the
utility of its testing program, it could not show that the program fulfilled
any business need or that it served any legitimate business purpose. Finally,
in dealing with section 703 (h) the Hicks court said:
To interpret section 703 (h) as protecting use of tests which are
not shown to be job related would be to drastically undercut the
overall legislative purpose of Title VII, which is to eliminate all
unjustified impediments to the realization of full equal employ-
ment opportunity for Negroes. No court should read this result
into a minor subsection of Title VII absent the strongest and most
explicit legislative intent; and such does not appear in support of
section 703 (h).36
Using this approach, the court struck down the use of the tests for both
hiring and promotion purposes.
The leading case rejecting the Guidelines and adopting the business
needs or the legitimate business purpose approach was Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.37 In this case the company used the Wonderlic Personnel Test
and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test to implement a policy
that promotion from the lowest paying department in the plant required(1) a high school diploma, or (2) scores on the two standardized tests equal
to those achieved by the average high school graduate. The plaintiff
alleged that Duke Power's testing requirements were discriminatory and
unlawful because there was no showing of a business need for the re-
quirements; that Duke Power did not conduct any studies to discern
83. Id. at 318.
34. Id. at 319. See also Note, supra note 3, at 710, which indicates that valida-
tion requires that tests be judged against job performance, rather than by what
they caim to measure, and that sample populations used in validating tests mustinclude representative members of the minority groups to which the tests will be
applied.
35. Hicks v. Grown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314, 319 (E.D. La. 1970).
36. Id. at 321.
37. 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
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whether such requirements were related to an employee's ability to per-
form his duties; and that the tests were not job-related as required by sec-
tion 703 (h). The company admitted that it began use of the tests without
any formal studies of whether they measured job-related skills and abilities,
but attempted to justify the use of standardized tests by arguing that as
its business became more complex, it needed more intelligent employees
who could progress within the company.38 The court upheld the use of
standardized tests, because they served the genuine business purpose of
securing more intelligent employees, were developed by professional psy-
chologists, and were not used with any intent to discriminate.3 9
The Griggs court rejected the Guidelines as explicitly as the Hicks
court had adopted them. It recognized that agency interpretations are en-
titled to great weight, but stated that the Guidelines were not conclusive,
because they were directly contrary to the legislative history of Title VII.
According to the court, "At no place in the Act or in its legislative history
does there appear a requirement that employers use only those tests
which measure the ability and skill required by a specific job or group of
jobs."40
The cases taking the Hicks view sought to establish a standard of
job-relatedness which required the employer to show something dose to
a direct correlation between the abilities tested and the job skills required.
This standard focused upon the individual applicant or employee and
the requirements of the particular job for which he was tested.
On the other hand, the Griggs line of cases recognized testing as lawful
if it served any legitimate business purpose or met a business needs
standard. The business needs standard focused upon the pool of skills
possessed by an employer's work force and recognized the validity of the
employer's interest in maximizing the quality of that pool of skills through
the use of standardized tests. 41
The Supreme Court decided the Griggs case, and through it established
the standard applicable to all employment testing cases brought under
Title VII.42 In the majority opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 43 Chief
Justice Burger used expansive language in dealing with whether Title VII
prohibits conditioning employment or promotion on passing a standardized
general intelligence test, when the test is not shown to be significantly
related to job performance. This language tended to combine the job-
relatedness and the business needs tests. For example, Chief Justice Burger
stated:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1233.
40. Id. at 1235.
41. Developments, supra note 22, at 1138.
42. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), put that circuit
in conflict with. the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Local 189,
United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1969), which was followed in Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319
F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970).
43. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation. The touch-
stone is business necessity. If an employment practice which oper-
ates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.44
Also, the Court gave great deference to the Guidelines, as interpretations of
the Act by the agency charged with enforcing it.45 The Chief Justice
said that the E.E.O.C.'s construction of section 703 (h) as requiring that
employment tests be job-related was consistent with Congress's intent in
passing the section, as evidenced by the legislative history of the Act.46
In applying its standard to the testing procedure of Duke Power Co.
the Court made it clear that the Act does not preclude the use of tests per se.
The Court stated that the Act does forbid using tests to make employment
or promotion decisions, unless they are "demonstrably a reasonable measure
of job performance."47 Because the company in Griggs failed to justify its
testing procedures under this standard, the court reversed the part of the
holding of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that was favorable to
Duke Power Co.
The test adopted by the Supreme Court for determining whether an
employer's use of standardized tests is lawful under Title VII is a "rea-
sonableness" test, somewhere between the strict job-relatedness test ad-
vanced by the E.E.O.C. and adopted by the court in Hicks and the business
needs test adopted by the lower courts as in Griggs. Such a test does not
require a one-to-one correlation between skills and abilities tested andjob requirements, but requires the employer to show more than just an
arguably legitimate business purpose.
An interesting and important aspect of the test now applicable in all
Title VII testing cases is demonstrated in United States v. Georgia Power
Co.,48 decided two months after the Supreme Court handed down the
Griggs test. The facts of the case were similar to those in Griggs with one
important exception. The Georgia Power Co. introduced expert testimony
and empirical evidence tending to show that the tests were "demonstrably
a reasonable measure of job performance." 49 After reviewing the evidence,
the court held that the company's conditioning employment or promotion
upon a passing score on aptitude tests was lawful under Title VII, even
though blacks scored significantly lower than whites. 0 The reasons given
by the court were that the tests (one of which was the Bennett Test of
Mechanical Comprehension) were (1) professionally developed, (2) adopted
after study of their relationship to job performance, (3) predictive of or
significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior com-
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id. at 433-34.
46. Id. at 434.
47. Id. at 436.
48. 3 FAIR EMPL. PrAc. CAs. 767 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The United States is a
party because the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (a) (1964)
allows the Attorney General to bring civil actions when he has reasonable cause
to believe that any employer is engaged in resistance to the full employment
rights secured by the Act.
49. Id. at 786.
50. Id. at 791.
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prising or relevant to jobs, (4) validated in a professional manner by
reputable professionals, and (5) demonstrably a reasonable measure of
job performance. 51
This case demonstrates that the test adopted by the Supreme Court
in Griggs shifts the burden of going forward with evidence on the issue
of job-relatedness from the plaintiff to the defendant employer. This means
that the steps taken prior to the institution of testing procedures are crucial,
because the employer must be able to produce evidence showing that the
tests are a reasonable measure of the skills required for successful perform-
ance of his jobs. He should consult with experts in the field of testing
prior to instituting any testing program and have expert management of
his program. If these steps are taken the chances are good that a court
will find his procedures lawful under section 703 (h) by applying the
reasonableness test that the Supreme Court has held applicable to all Title
VII testing cases.52
B. The Equal Protection Clause
If the required state action exists, it is possible for a minority-group
plaintiff challenging an employer's use of testing as discriminatory to bring
an action based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. For such a plaintiff, an action on equal protection grounds may be
preferable to a Title VII action for two reasons. First, a Title VII action
may be unavailable because the employer is one not covered by Title VII.
However, the importance of this reason for a plaintiff's preferring the equal
protection clause to Title VII has declined since the Equal Employer Op-
portunity Act of 1972 expanded the coverage of Title VII."a That Act
widened the definition of "employer" to include states and their political
subdivisions and removed the exemption, contained in the 1964 Act, of
educational institutions with respect to persons whose work involves edu-
cational activities.54
Second, courts tend to place a heavier burden upon the employer of
justifying the discriminatory effect of his employment testing under the
equal protection clause than under Title VII. In cases under the equal
protection clause, district courts have tended to require employers to show
a "compelling necessity or justification," rather than a mere "rational
basis," in order to justify their employment testing when it produces a
racially discriminatory effect. 55 Unfortunately, these cases contain little
analysis of the equal protection issues involved in them. Further, few of
these cases have been appealed; therefore, the equal protection arguments
in them have received no further judicial treatment.
51. Id. at 786-87.
52. 21 DRAKE L. REv. 188, 194 (1971).
53. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 2 (1), 86 Stat. 103(1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964); text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
54. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972),
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).
55. See Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Armstead v. Starkville School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Penn
v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970). But see Davis v. Washington, 4
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 1132 (D.D.C. 1972); Western Addition Community v.
Alioto, 330 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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In two of the cases that have been appealed,5 6 the interplay between
opinions of the district courts and the courts of appeals leaves an interesting
uncertainty as to which equal protection standard applies to unintentional
discrimination by employment testing-"compelling necessity or justifica-
tion" or "rational basis." One of these cases, Chance v. Board of Examiners,
will be considered here in order to illustrate the approach that the courts
took. In Chance, the two class action plaintiffs, one black and one Puerto
Rican, were both performing successfully as acting principals in New
York City schools, but could not get permanent appointments because of
failure to pass competitive intelligence tests. They alleged that the tests,
given to candidates for supervisory positions in New York City schools,
discriminated against blacks and Puerto Ricans, and were neither shown
to test abilities and skills necessary to job performance, nor to predict
whether a candidate would succeed on the job. Plaintiffs alleged that the
discriminatory effect of the use of the tests, coupled with a lack of any
valid justification for their use, violated their constitutional rights.57
The basic problem for the plaintiffs in Chance was to make a con-
vincing argument that theirs was a racial case and thereby persuade the
district court to apply the more stringent equal protection test applicable
to racial discrimination cases.58 They contended that once a discriminatory
impact was shown, the burden shifted to the Board to show a compelling
necessity or justification for tests having an unintended discriminatory
effect.50 The Board defended by contending that the plaintiffs had to
show that there was no rational relationship between the examinations
and the requirements of the supervisory positions for which they were
given. 0o
Thus, the issue before the Chance court was whether the giving of
general intelligence tests to applicants for supervisory positions in a school
system, having a discriminatory effect against black and Puerto Rican
applicants, violated their rights under the equal protection clause. The
district court's decision turned on whether the compelling necessity test
or the rational relationship test would be applied. The court applied the
compelling necessity test in granting a preliminary injunction against
further use by the Board of the tests in question.61 It concluded that the
testing program had a discriminatory impact on blacks and Puerto Ricans
and said:
Such a discriminatory impact is constitutionally suspect and
laces the burden on the Board to show that the examinations can
e justified as necessary to obtain Principals, Assistant Principals
and supervisors possessing the skills and qualifications required for
56. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 4
FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 596 (2d Cir. 1972); Armstead v. Starkville School Dist., 325
F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971), affd 4 FAim EML. PRAc. GAs. 864 (5th Cir. 1972).
57. 330 F. Supp. at 205.
58. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
59. 330 F. Supp. at 214-15.
60. Id. at 215.
61. Id. at 224.
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successful performance of the duties of these positions. The Board
has failed to meet this burden.62
This standard arguably places a heavier burden on the employer than the
Supreme Court's requirement under Title VII that the tests be "demon-
strably a reasonable measure of job performance."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision in Chance, but refused to hold that the "com-
pelling necessity or justification" test was applicable. First, the court noted
that the Supreme Court has never applied the more stringent equal pro-
tection standard to a case involving unintended racially discriminatory
effects. 63 Then, the court stated:
Manifestly, the question whether that test should be applied to
de facto discriminatory classifications is a difficult one and is not
to be resolved by facile reference to cases involving intentional
racial classifications. We think, however, that the district court's
decision may be upheld under the "more lenient equal protection
standard" and so find it unnecessary to reach this most difficult
question.64
Thus, the opinion provides no answer to the question of which standard
applies to employment testing discrimination cases, but merely suggests
that the Second Circuit will be reluctant to apply the "compelling neces-
sity or justification" test.
It is submitted that in cases of unintended racial discrimination caused
by employment testing the more lenient test, "rational basis," is the more
appropriate. It is true that in racial classification cases the Supreme Court
has consistently applied the compelling state interest or necessity test.65
However, employment testing discrimination cases involve classifications
racially neutral on their face, but which have a racially discriminatory ef-
fect. Under traditional equal protection analysis, racially discriminatory
effect alone probably creates no substantial equal protection question.66
62. Id. at 223. In reaching its conclusion the court relied on Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970) and
Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Tramp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
The district court in Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist.,
325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971), reached a result similar to that reached in
Chance. The court there held that the defendant failed to sustain its burden of
showing "an overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination."
The defendant was using Graduate Record Examination scores in teacher place-
ment, and this had the effect of discriminating against blacks. Id. at 570.
63. 4 FAmn EMPL. PRAC. CAs. at 603.
64. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Armstead stated
that it did not have to rule on the validity of the district court's determi-
nation that the school district's testing requirements created a racial
classification to which the "compelling necessity" test applied. Instead,
the court held the testing program invalid even under the "rational basis"
test, stating that the program "is not reasonably related to the purpose
for which it was designed." 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. at 866.
65. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
66. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of the employment testing situation
as involving classifications that otherwise impinge on constitutional rights
or "fundamental" interests, which require a more stringent equal protection
review.6 7 Therefore, the classifications created by employment testing
arguably should be treated as economic, to which the "rational basis" test
applies.
Cases which apply the compelling necessity test seem to skirt James v.
Valtierra,08 a case which indicates that the rational basis test should be
applied in a case where a challenged practice is neutral on its face but
discriminatory in effect. In that case, it was argued that a California re-
quirement that public housing projects be approved by a majority of those
voting at a community election violated equal protection in that it tended
to place a "special burden" on minority groups, who are the predominant
users of public housing. The Supreme Court noted that a state procedure
that "disadvantages" a particular group "does not always deny equal pro-
tection" and in effect found a rational basis for the referendum arrange-
ment.09
From a consideration of the testing cases brought under the equal
protection clause, the one conclusion that can be reached is that many
federal district courts are sympathetic to the plaintiff's cause. Even in
cases lacking analysis, the courts grant injunctions preventing the con-
tinued use of tests. Because these cases are not being appealed, the battle
for the plaintiff can be won at the district court level, where his major
hurdle is convincing the court that his case falls within the "racial" category.
IV. CONCLUSION
The test that will always be applied in a Title VII testing case is
whether the tests used by the employer are demonstrated to be a reasonable
measure of job performance. Under the equal protection clause less is re-
quired if the rational basis test is applied. Then, the employer must
show merely a rational connection between the tests used and his business
needs. On the other hand, should a court fail to note that testing has only
a discriminatory effect and view a testing case as a case of racial discrimina-
tion, more is required under the equal protection clause than under Title
VII. The employer must show a compelling necessity for the use of his
testing procedures, a burden virtually impossible for him to meet.
GARY WALLACE
67. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
68. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 40 U.S.L.W. 4585(U.S. May 30, 1972), in which Justice Rehnquist said at 4589:
The acceptance of appellant's constitutional theory would render suspect
each difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking
in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might
be. Few legislative efforts to deal with the difficult problems posed by
welfare programs could survive such scrutiny, and we do not find it re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment.
69. 402 U.S. at 142.
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